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the Dominican Republic actually benefited when forcibly placed on a fiscal
diet by the United States. Although the
U.S. Marines were ensuring that nearly
half the Dominican Republic’s revenues
went to repay foreign creditors, their
honesty in disbursing the remainder
was so notable that the country received
more funds than it had under its own
rulers. Boot also points out that
Veracruz reached a record standard of
cleanliness and hygiene, with an attendant improvement in public health,
than it had known previously. Boot reminds us that far from resulting in
quagmires of despair and failure, many
of these conflicts have to be seen as U.S.
successes.
There are, however, several criticisms
that might potentially be leveled at this
work. Some may say that like so many
correspondents before him, Boot
excessively admires the U.S. Marines,
extolling their triumphs at the expense
of the other services. However, while
there is no denying that Boot has high
regard for leathernecks, he does provide
ample examples of Navy and Army actions. It is also important to remember
that the Marines were the service of
choice for the great majority of these
conflicts. A significant portion of the
Marines’ senior leadership in the 1930s
felt that the future of the Corps should
be bound up in mastering the challenges of these conflicts. This resulted
in the Marines’ Small Wars Manual,
published in 1941. It was later shelved;
Boot believes that it would have benefited the United States in Vietnam had
those in charge read the dusty tome.
Another criticism that might be made
by some is that Boot glosses over the
darker aspects of small wars, focusing
on the successes and personalities. For
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example, the first charging of a serving
flag officer with a war crime, the use of
torture to extract information, and mutinies of such U.S. trained units as the
Nicaraguan National Guard were part
of the small-war experience. However,
Boot discusses these events in clear and
unequivocal terms, leaving the reader
to come to grips with how these aspects
of war played in U.S. successes.
What make this book so timely and one
that should be read by almost anyone
with an interest in political-military
issues, are the tie-ins that Boot identifies as existing between the wars of the
past and the realities of the present. Issues such as exit strategies, expected casualties, the difficulties of working with
local allies, and the complexities of state
building are not things the United
States is facing for the first time. Indeed, as Boot demonstrates, the nation
has been dealing with these dilemmas
since the beginning of its existence.
Well written, timely, and provocative,
Savage Wars of Peace is well worth
attention.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Vidal, Gore. Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace:
How We Got to Be So Hated. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002. 160pp. $10

It would be difficult to find a book on
world affairs more contrary to the opinions of most readers of the Naval War
College Review or other members of the
American national security community
than Gore Vidal’s Perpetual War for
Perpetual Peace.
As a military officer myself, I disagree
with many of Vidal’s assumptions and
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propositions, but the book is worthwhile because it challenges one to think
about inconsistencies and issues in
American foreign policy as well as domestic security. The book is extremely
well written, as one would expect from
a writer of Vidal’s caliber. It is highly
engaging, and most military professionals interested in American national
security will probably find it easy to
read (although fewer may find it easy to
agree with).
Gore Vidal is a noted novelist, perhaps
one of the most prominent living
American authors. In 1943 he enlisted
in the Navy and served in World War
II, so his background lends relevant experience in military affairs. He wrote
his commentary shortly after the 11
September attack, but after both Vanity
Fair and The Nation declined it, a version of this book was printed in Italy,
where it became a best-seller. After
subsequent publication in Europe,
Vidal was finally able to get the book
published in its present form.
Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace contains seven chapters and an introduction, but much of the material predates
“9/11,” which is one of the book’s chief
weaknesses. Three chapters were reprinted from his The Last Empire
(Doubleday, 2001), and these were recycled from earlier articles. Another
chapter, “The Meaning of Timothy
McVeigh,” appeared in the September
2001 issue of Vanity Fair. There are
sparse updates throughout the older
chapters, including asterisked footnotes
and comments, such as one briefly
comparing the Oklahoma City bombing to “Dark Tuesday” (“9/11”). However, the meat of the new work appears
in the first chapter, “September 11,
2001 (A Tuesday).”
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Vidal’s sharp mind and readable writing style make his arguments on the
World Trade Center attacks and the aftermath compelling. For instance, the
declaration of an ambiguous “war” on
terror has been the subject of much discussion in the pages of foreign affairs
journals and newspaper editorials.
Vidal notes that insurance companies
benefit from a state of war due to exception clauses in insurance agreements, although previous U.S. case law
has established that “acts of war” can
originate only from “a sovereign nation, not a bunch of radicals.”
Some of his other comments lean more
toward “Swiftian literary exaggeration,”
of which he accuses H. L. Mencken in a
letter to Timothy McVeigh. His portrayal of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
and Vice President Dick Cheney as eager for a police state seems excessive.
Also, he compares the terrorist attacks
in the United States to such statesponsored atrocities as the burning of
the Reichstag (secretly perpetrated by
the Nazi government in order to consolidate Hitler’s police power) and
rapes by bogus Vietcong squads to discredit the communist insurgency. This
paranoid proclivity toward conspiracy
theory is revealed in his assertion that
Opus Dei is a conservative Catholic
conspiracy in the United States. He
makes a point about Thomas Jefferson’s
and John Adams’s opposition to Jesuit
activity in America, which is probably
more an indicator of American
anti-Catholic bigotry several hundred
years ago than any prescient warning of
the dangers of religious incursion into
state affairs.
There are, however, several arguments
that are more convincing. Vidal contends that terror attacks caused more
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damage to civil liberties than to the nation’s physical well-being. “Once alienated, an ‘unalienable right’ is apt to be
forever lost.” He documents this assertion with a list of police killings of innocent people in their homes and of
indefensible searches and seizures.
While a reasonable reader may dismiss
these discomforting examples as well
researched exceptions to normal law
enforcement activity in the United
States, Vidal also brings up the changing nature of the law. He refers to U.S.
v. Sandini (1987), which established
that police were able to seize property
permanently from an individual if the
property has been used for criminal
purposes, even if the individual has had
no involvement with any crime. This
ruling has highly negative implications,
considering that 90 percent of American paper currency has traces of narcotics on it from use in the drug trade.
Vidal also points out a common problem that is not commonly pondered—
the incidence of homosexual rape in the
U.S. prison system, a violation of the
cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause
of the Bill of Rights. For anyone who
doubts that such punishment is state
sanctioned, Vidal quotes a state attorney general who refers to this practice
in a public statement made in the
course of his official duties. He is reminiscent of the military author Colonel
Charles Dunlap, U.S. Army, in his references to blatant disrespect to President Bill Clinton on a naval vessel by
seamen, who called Clinton “the Praetorian Guard of the Pentagon,” and our
“ruling junta.”
There is one other weakness: the book
fails to address properly the meat of the
issue that its title promises—“how we
got to be so hated.” The Federation of
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American Scientists has published a
twenty-page listing of American military operations dating from 1948 to
1999, documenting how the United
States (like the nations of Orwell’s
1984) has an “enemy of the month
club” and thus engages in a “perpetual
war” hoping for “perpetual peace.” This
theme is underdeveloped, however, and
Vidal’s discussion of the United States
emphasizes domestic repression, while
his reprinted chapters focus too exclusively on an apology (in the Platonic
sense of an explanation) of Timothy
McVeigh.
Altogether, Perpetual War for Perpetual
Peace presents a provocative argument
that will be of intellectual appeal to
professional military officers. It is admittedly an alternative perspective, but
it may give members of the American
national security community insight
into how our European allies think, as
well as our Third World adversaries,
who often share Vidal’s perspective.
Vidal’s arguments are intriguing, but
the brevity of the new parts of this
work ultimately leaves his thoughts
incomplete.
MICHAEL MORGAN

Captain, U.S. Army

Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau, eds. The
Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in
the Soviet-Afghan War. Quantico, Va.: U.S. Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division. 416pp.
(no price given)

What could be both more poignant and
ludicrous than Commander Abdul Baqi
Balots’s account of his survival of a
firefight in which his closest friend was
killed? “I saw a lot of Soviets coming at
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